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INTRODUCTION

MTihe Clinton Administrationfaces the toughest test of its approachto
reconciling conservation and economic development. What started as
a search for consensus could end in the traditionalfashion, with
deeply divided partisans seeking outright victory in court-casting
doubt on whether the Administration's consensus-building approach
to managing natural resources can succeed.'
President Bill Clinton swept into Washington promising change and
an end to gridlock. His motto is "collaboration, not confrontation," and
his modus operandi is the town hall meeting.2 Implicit in his approach is a
belief that government can facilitate consensus-building and conflict resolution.3 Following his election, he selected Bruce Babbitt, a former Arizona governor and respected consensus-builder on western issues," to head
the previously "environmentally challenged" Interior Department.5 But at
the mid-point of the Clinton presidency, Babbitt and the Clinton Administration have had few successes. In Florida, Babbitt's year-long effort
working with sugar growers to develop water-quality controls to protect
the Florida everglades has not yet produced an out-of-court settlement. 6
After President Clinton's well-publicized timber summit in Portland,
Oregon, 7 his timber plan still faces possible legal challenges from both
loggers and environmentalists. 8 And western livestock interests, angry at
Babbitt's efforts to reform grazing policies, have organized the second
coming of the Sagebrush Rebellion. 9
1. John H. Cushman Jr., Owl Issue Tests Reliance on Consensus in Environmentalism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at 28.
2. Id.
3. See generally Richard M. Weintraub, Clinton's Airline Activism: White House
Seeks Role in Disputes, WASH. Posr, Nov. 24, 1993, at D1.
4. See Secretary Babbi,: Winning Them Over, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jan. 27, 1993
at A12 (claiming Babbitt brought consensus-building "to a new level" in Arizona). For a
description of then Governor Babbitt's role in developing a consensus solution to groundwater reform, see Desmond D. Connall, Jr., A History of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313.
5. See Ed Marston, Can Bruce Babbitt make Interior hum?, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Jan. 25, 1993 at 1, 1 (describing "12 years of bottled up demand for change").
6. Cushman, supra note I, at 28.
7. Tom Kenworthy, The Owl and the Lumberjack: Can Clinton Break the Logjam?
Oregon Conference Tests Ability to Reconcile Economic, Ecological Needs, WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 1993, at A4.
8. See Cushman, supra note 1, at 28.
9. See Tom Kenworthy, The Lord of the Land; Bruce Babbitt Rode Out of The Mythical
Old West. Now He's Loading Up For a Showdown Wth It, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1994, at Fl.
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This article uses dispute resolution theory to analyze Secretary Bruce
Babbitt's efforts to develop consensus about western resource policy.10
Part II describes the characteristics of a successful dispute resolution process. Part III applies this framework to two case studies of Babbitt's efforts. The first case study involves a conflict in Alaska between financially beleaguered fishermen and oil companies whom the fishermen blame
for their hardships. Babbitt, taking the role of mediator, helped the disputing parties end a showdown in the Valdez Narrows. This case study
illustrates the types of situations that are amenable to resolution through
consensus. The second case study chronicles Babbitt's efforts to enact
grazing reform on federal lands. Again using the framework of part II,
this article explains the reasons for his difficulties.
After analyzing why Babbitt's efforts have been relatively unsuccessful, part IV considers whether consensus is an appropriate goal for environmental policy. This section concludes that consensus should only be
sought when it is likely to produce mutual gain for all parties-particularly disputes that do not involve parties' fundamental values.
More important, if a government seeks to develop consensus among
conflicting groups, it must make its dispute resolution process voluntary.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF A SUCCESSFUL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS

President Clinton's goal of maintaining environmental quality
while preserving jobs reflects a larger movement in American society
away from confrontation toward consensus-building." As Americans
The Sagebrush Rebellion was an effort in the early 1980s to privatize federal lands or alternatively to give state title to federal lands. Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An
IntergovernmentalPerspective on the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 848 (1982). Although characterized as the second coming of the Sagebrush Rebellion, the two movements are
different. The Sagebrush Rebellion was an offensive maneuver to take control of federal lands;
the current effort is a defensive movement to protect existing government progiams and subsidies. Unfortunately, some Westerners may believe defensive action includes violence. See Steve
Yozwiak, Ranchers: Gazing Plan Could Spark Range War Cattlemen Suspicious of New Rules,
Fees, ARIZ. REP., Aug. 7, 1994 at Al, AI0 (describing Catron County's resolution calling for
all residents to maintain firearms in response to Babbitt's proposals).
10. Almost all dispute resolution literature concerns private means to resolve conflict, such as using a mediator or arbitrator. See generally JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT
RAU, & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS (1989). The notion that government itself can facilitate dispute resolution has
received less study. For a description of how government can be an effective mediator for
conflicting interest groups, see Tom Melling, Dispute Resolution Within Legislative Institutions, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1677, 1700-03 (1994).
11. DOUGLAS AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 10-12 (1986);
Bernie Jones, A Comparison of Consensus and Voting in Public Decision Making, 10
NEGOTIATION J. 161, 161 & n.I (1994).
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search for collaborative solutions to their disputes, scholars and academics have written extensively about the processes that are most
likely to produce consensus. Indeed, a large body of literature specifically discusses environmental dispute resolution. 2 Although this literature contains some variations, general agreement exists about the attributes of a successful dispute resolution process. 13 This section outlines four attributes-voluntariness, participation, identification of
interests, and the development of options-and discusses why they are
needed to build a consensus.
Before describing these four attributes, however, it is important to
understand the advantages to a cooperative resolution of conflict, that
have made dispute resolution increasingly popular. At the heart of dispute
resolution research lies the following question: Why does conflict persist
when disputing parties could make themselves better off by cooperating? 4
Often disputing parties overlook or never have an opportunity to discover
joint gains. In fact, there are many building blocks that can produce joint
gains. For example, parties may have shared interests." Parties can also
12. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BACOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984); JANE MCCARTHY & ALICE SHORETl, NEGOTIATING
SETTLEMENT, A GUIDE To ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION (1984); SCOTT MERNITz,
MEDIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A SOURCEBOOK (1980); ALLAN R.
TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION

(1983); Barbara H. Kelly, Alternative Dispute Resolution of Environmental Insurance
Coverage Claims, 691 PLI/COMM 511 (1994); Edward J. Costello, Jr., Alternative
Dispute Resolution in California: An Overview, 504 PLI/Lrr 221 (1994); Stephen
Crable, ADR: A Solution for EnvironmentalDisputes, Mediation, 48 MAR. ARB. J. 24
(1993); Eric. R. Max, Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation, 2 N.Y. U.ENVTL.
L.J. 210 (1993); Melanie J. Rowland, Bargaining for Life: Protecting Biodiversity
through Mediated Agreements, 22 ENVrL. L. 503 (1992).
13. See Bryan M. Johnston & Paul J. Krupin, The 1989 Pacific Northwest Thnber Compromise: An EnvironmentalDispute Resolution Case Study of a Successful Battle That May Have
Lost the War, 27 WILLAMEITh L. REv. 613, 624-25 (1991). Some dispute resolution scholars
prescribe a long list of specific requirements needed for a successful dispute resolution process.
For example Lawrence Susskind has a list of nine required steps, such as setting a tineline for
the process, jointly weighing judgments about costs and benefits, and ensuring the legality and
financial feasibility of bargains. Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1. 14 (1981). This paper takes the position that a dispute resolution process can be more flexible than the one Susskind prescribes, but the four characteristics
discussed in this section ordinarily must be satisfied. At a minimum, all the parties must agree
on the process to be used. Jones, supra note 11, at 168.
14. See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriersto
the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. I. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 238 (1993). The labor
strike between Easter Airlines and its Union, Texaco's battle with Pennzoil over Getty
Oil, and Art Buehwald's lawsuit against Paramount Pictures over the movie "Coming to
America" are a few prominent examples where alternative action would have benefited
both parties. Id. at 236-38.
15. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 106-111 (1986). In many situations,
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create value from differences. 6 Differences in valuation create the opportunity for joint gains from trade. Differences in probability assessment
can be the basis for contingency agreements. And differences in risk
aversion can lead to risk-sharing schemes.
Because parties often fail to realize joint gains, dispute resolution
scholars try to identify barriers that prevent parties from using these
building blocks-that is, barriers that prevent the cooperative resolution of conflict.' 7 There are many types of barriers, including strategic, psychological, and institutional barriers." Strategic barriers arise
when individual parties, acting in their rational self interest, achieve
outcomes that are collectively deficient. Relevant to this article is a
strategic barrier known as the negotiator's dilemma.' 9 In a negotiation, each side confronts a tension: A party can try to create value by
honestly communicating interests and exploring possible joint gains, or
a party can try to claim value by concealing her true interests, making
threats, taking positions, and misleading other parties. Revealing true
preferences and interests, however, can make one vulnerable to claiming tactics. Thus, it appears rational for a negotiator to deceive, mislead, and conceal. But when both sides use claiming tactics, joint gains
are often left on the table. Also relevant to this article are psychological barriers that impede rationale cooperation.'o For example, environmentalists and ranchers have been disputing for decades, and both may

parties do not realize that they have shared interests. Id. at 107. Parties may also be able
to create joint gains from economies of scale. Id. at 111-12.
16. Id. at 92-105. The international law of the sea treaty is an example of how
parties can dovetail differences. Id. at 102-104.
17. The Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation has helped develop the concept
of barriers as a useful framework to study conflict and the resolution of conflict. Robert H.
Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction, in BARRIERS TO THE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF
CONFLICT (Kenneth Arrow ct al., eds., Norton Press, 1995) (manuscript at 5).

18. Id. It is also important to understand what is not a barrier to the cooperative
resolution of conflict. If a party's best alternative is unilateral action rather than negotiation (or another form of dispute resolution), this may be a "barrier" to negotiation, but it
is not a "barrier to the cooperative resolution of conflict." On the other hand, parties often
mistakenly believe that the best alternative is unilateral action. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND &
JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING

DISPUTES 27 (1987). This is a barrier to the cooperative resolution of conflict. For further
discussion on this distinction, see Melling, supra note 10, at 1680 n. 20.
19. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 15, at 29-45. The negotiator's dilemma is modeled
after the more famous prisoner's dilemma. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 7-11 (1984). The dominant strategy is to "defect" rather than "cooperate," but
when both defect, each receives a suboptimal result Lax and Sebenius also suggest ways to
manage the negotiator's dilemma. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 15, at 154-82.
20. See generally Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriersto Conflict Resolution,
7 NEGOTIATION J. 389 (describing loss aversion, reactive devaluation, and other psychological phenomena).
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feel more comfortable with conflict than with a cooperative style
where both sides work together to find cooperative gains. 21
Having identified various barriers, it is possible to recommend
negotiating styles and processes that help parties overcome these types
of barriers and engender a cooperative negotiating atmosphere.' In
fact, most of the popular dispute resolution literature is devoted to
recommending styles and processes.' The rest of this part describes
four attributes of a dispute resolution process that help disputing parties identify cooperative solutions which leave both parties better off
than unilateral action.
A. Voluntary Process
The most important attribute of a process designed to produce consensus is voluntariness.24 Voluntariness means that parties are free to
participate or withdraw from a process. Voluntariness ensures that parties will engage in a process openly rather than defensively:

21. Michael Riley. Babbitt gambled, got conflict, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, May
18, 1994 at Al, Al0. See also Todd B. Carver & Albert R. Vondra, Alternative Dispure Resolution: Why it doesn't work and why it does, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW,
May-June 1994, 120, 123 (describing how competitive approaches to dispute resolution are ingrained in corporate culture); Jones, supra note 11, at 163 (citing M.
Avery, B. Auvine, B. Streibel, and L. Weiss, Building United Judgement-A Handbook for Consensus Decisionmaking (1981)). Clinton exacerbated ranchers' distrust
and antagonism towards grazing reform when he unilaterally tried to raise grazing
fees in the 1993 budget bill. Jill Lawrence, War on the West, THE SHERIDAN PRESS.
June 7, 1994 at B1. From a strategic perspective, it was a poor decision. Id. The
negotiator's dilemma suggests that the most effective strategy for achieving joint
gains is TIT-for-TAT, which requires a friendly or cooperative first move. LAX &
SEBENIUS, supra note 15, at 158-60.
22. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 14, at 248-49 (describing how mediators can
help overcome strategic, principal/agent, cognitive, and reactive devaluation barriers);
Melling, supra note 10, at 1682-1709 (describing barriers in legislative institutions and
ways to overcome the barriers).
23. LAX & SEBENiUS, supra note 15, at 112-14. Some of the popular literature includes:
THOMAS E. CROWLEY, SETTLE IT OUT OF COURT: HOW TO RESOLVE BUSINESS AND
PERSONAL DISPUTES USING MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND NEGOTIATION (1994); ROGER
FISHER & SCOTT BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER: BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP THAT GETS
To YES (1988); ROGER FISHER, ELIZABETH KOPELMAN, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER,
BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR COPING WITH CONFLICT (1994); ROGER FISHER &

WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 62-79
(1981); WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO: NEGOTIATING WITH DIFFICULT PEOPLE
(1991); WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT, STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DIS-

PUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS (1988).
24. See generally SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC

DISPUTES (1988).
25. Jones, supra note 11, at 168.
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Making a unilateral decision and then informing a group (whose
members are already irritated about some public policy matter)
that they will work for consensus probably does little to predispose people to be agreeable. It would be better to convey to the
group a sense of the alternative approaches available for decision
making given the specific situation (e.g. type of issue, time constraints, numbers of stakeholders, etc.), and then have the group
come to a decision about which path to pursue. 2
In addition, voluntariness means that the interested parties, not outsiders,
must set the agenda.27 Each side must have the autonomy to pursue alternatives that are in their self-interest-alternatives that they can genuinely
support. If a dispute resolution process is not voluntary, conflict will very
likely continue.'2
The 1989 Pacific Northwest "timber compromise" demonstrates how
a lack of voluntariness will destroy attempts to develop a consensus. For
many years environmentalists had been battling the Forest Service and
timber interests over logging policies in the old growth forests of the
Pacific Northwest.29 Beginning in the late 1980s, environmentalists won a
series of court cases against the Forest Service for its "deliberate and
systematic refusal" to protect the threatened Northern Spotted Owl.3
These judicial opinions forced the Forest Service and BLM to reduce the
number of scheduled and approved timber sales." The reduced cuts
threatened thousands of timber jobs and timber harvest revenues for rural

26. Id. at 168-69.
27. Id.
28. See Jonathan Brock, Mandated Mediation, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 57 (1991).

Brock argues that it is difficult to successfully institutionalize dispute settlement mechanisms that rely on negotiated settlements between conflicting interests. Instead, he suggests
it is better to find other means to make dispute resolution processes more easily available
and to create a greater understanding and acceptance of dispute resolution processes in
public policy arenas.
29. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND,
WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST, 156-67 (1992).
30. Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1089 (W.D. Wash.
1991). Some of the important timber cases include Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel,
716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (holding that the Fish and Wildlife Service
acted arbitrarily in denying the petition to list the spotted owl); Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding preliminary injunction
of timber sales); and Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1091
(W.D. Wash. 1991) (finding that the Forest Service violated the National Forest
Management Act), aff'd 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991). For an academic description
of the court cases, see Michael Blumm, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and Modern
Public Land Law, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605 (1991).
31. Johnston & Krupin, supra note 13, at 621 & n.41.
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communities. 2 Consequently, Oregon's political delegation organized a
"timber summit" to bring environmentalists and timber interests together
to resolve the timber conflict. The summit was billed as a "mediationlike, non-litigious dispute resolution process. 33 In fact, Oregon's politicians had a much different plan. After both environmentalists and timber
lobbyists made their opening statements, Oregon's politicians announced
that they had hammered out a "compromise" proposal, which they intended to attach to an upcoming appropriations bill. 34 The summit proposal
surprised both timber interests and environmentalists. Although the timber
interests wanted more time to study the proposal, they gave their reluctant
support.3 ' Environmentalists refused to endorse the "compromise." They
contended that the "compromise" cleared the way for continued logging
without solving the underlying problems of forest management and spotted owl protection.36 This disingenuous dispute resolution process never
had a chance to develop a consensus-or even a "compromise"-because
it violated the requirements of voluntariness. First, environmentalists
never had an opportunity to withdraw before the "compromise" was
announced. Second, timber interests and environmentalists never had an
opportunity to structure the agenda. Furthermore, the Timber Summit
failed to produce a consensus because the parties were excluded from the
decision making process, the second attribute that is described below.
B. ParticipationBy Interested Parties
In order to develop consensus, interested parties must have an opportunity to partake in the process that creates the consensus. If a party
is excluded from a process, any proclaimed resolution almost certainly

32. Id. at 615.
33. Id. at 615.
34. Id. at 631-32 & n.87. The "compromise" became section 318 of The Interior and

Related Agencies, Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701,
745-750 (1989). This appropriations bill amendment isknown as the "Hatfield rider." See Linda
M. Boldwan, Comment: The Hatfield Riders: Eliminating theRole of Courts in Environmental
Decision Making, 20 ENrTL. L. 329 (1990). Although the "compromise" was clearly a sham,
the Supreme Court may have considered it important in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,
112 S.Ct. 1407, 1408 (1992) (referring to the "Northwest Timber Compromise" and holding
that the "rider" amendment was valid). Although the "Hatfield rider" appeared to be a loss for
the environmentalists, the timber-harvesting injunctions ultimately were not affected. See
WILKdNsoN, supra note 29, at 335, endnote 86.
35. Johnston & Krupin, supra note 13, at 615, 632. Timber interests were "curiously silent during the period after the signing of the bill by the President." Id. at 637.
36. See id. at 632-636 (describing how the environmentalists were "outraged and incensed by the proposal").
37. Philip J. Hater, Negotiating Regulations:A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L. J. 1,
44 (1982).
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will not satisfy their interests."a For example, at the Northwest Timber
Summit, environmentalists never had a chance to participate in the negotiations that produced the "compromise." 39 They had no stake in the final
result and consequently not only refused to support it, but also fought it

in the courts.'
The requirement that all groups must have an opportunity to participate
in the process, however, can cause complications. If a large number of parties are involved, collaborative dispute resolution becomes infinitely more
complicated and often fails.41 For example, agency rulemaking by mediation
may not be appropriate for disputes concerning more than fifteen groups. 2 A
related problem arises with the selection of appropriate representatives for
large decentralized groups. Members of a large group may have differing
viewpoints that cannot be expressed by a single voice or representative. If a
group does not have a binding process to select a representative, various
factions may not consent to the final outcome.43
C. Identification of Interests
"Identify interests, not positions." This well-known aphorism was
penned by Roger Fisher and William Ury." When parties engage in positional bargaining, they often fail to hear and understand the interests of
the other parties, which can create a misunderstanding about the conflict's
real issues. Moreover, "positions beget counterpositions," and this type of
exchange ultimately leads to compromises that may not satisfy the parties'
underlying interests. 45 Focusing on interests rather than positions helps

38. Even if a proclaimed resolution did satisfy a party's interest, they may reject it
because of the "reactive devaluation" barrier. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
39. Johnston & Krupin, supra note 13, at 630-32. Timber interests were also excluded
from the negotiations, but they chose to grudgingly accept the proposal. See supra note 35.
40. See Johnston & Krupin, supra note 13, at 638-40.
41. See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 257, 273 (1982);
Note, Rethinking Regulation:Negotiation as an Alternative to TraditionalRulemaking, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1871, 1878 (1981). When disputes involve many parties, complicated procedural rules
aregenerally needed to maintain order. RAIFFA, supra note 41, at 299.
42. See Harter, supra note 37, at 47 (suggesting that agency rulemaking through
mediation, should be limited to disputes involving 15 or less groups). On the other hand,
EPA's experience with mediating superfund disputes suggests that "the number of parties
involved in a Superfund mediation does not appear to correlate with the success or failure
of mediation to produce a final settlement agreement." Lynn Peterson, The Promise of Mediated Settlements of Environmental Disputes: The Experience of EPA Region V, 17
COLUM. J.ENVrL. L. 327, 375-76 (1992).
43. See Lawrence Bacow & Michael Wheeler, Binding Parties to Agreements in
EnvironmentalDisputes, 2 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 99 (1991).
44. FISHER & URY, supra note 23, at 62-79.
45. FISHER & BROWN, supra note 23, at 144.
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reduce claiming tactics that create the negotiator's dilemma.46 Although
an important and seemingly obvious characteristic of dispute resolution
efforts, attention to interests can be forgotten or ignored. For example, in
the dispute over grazing reform discussed in the next section, many national environmental organizations pressed the position of raising grazing
fees rather than their interest in better range management.' In fact, environmentalists and ranchers do share a common interest in better range
management, but this position-taking created confrontation rather than an
open discussion of common interests.4"
D. Development of Possible Solutions and Options
One of the barriers to successful resolution of conflict is a psychological phenomena known as reactive devaluation.49 When a concession or proposal is made by a perceived adversary, the person
considering the concession or proposal is likely to value it less favorably simply because it is coming from his perceived adversary. Moreover, a compromise is rated less highly after it has been suggested by
the other side than before it is proposed.50 Consequently, most scholars
believe that an important part of any dispute resolution process is the
neutral development of possible solutions and options. 5 This is accomplished by collaborative brainstorming. To help prevent the problem of reactive devaluation, scholars urge that the brainstorming
should place in an atmosphere without evaluation, which can lead to
criticism and defensive reactions. In addition to solving the problems
associated with reactive devaluation, the development of options often
fosters creative new solutions. By working together, adversaries can
discover unforeseen ways to resolve a conflict that satisfy their respective interests. 2

46. See supra text accompanying note 19.
47. Most local environmental groups did emphasize their core interest in the health
of the range. See, e.g., "[a]s we have stated in other forums, we believe [grazing] fees are
the least important factor in the rangeland reform package. The economics of ranching is
much less important than the ecology of ranching." Letter from June Rain, Executive Director, Wyoming Wildlife Federation4, to Jim Baca, Director, Bureau of Land Management (Sept. 13, 1993) (on file with the Land & Water Law Review).
48. See infra note 106.
49. Ross & Stillinger, supra note 20, at 400.
50. Id.
51. See SUSAN M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA (1988).

52. See FISHER & URY, supra note 23, at 62-79. For an example of how environmentalists and water users worked together to craft new solutions to water conflicts, see
Tom Melling, The CUP Holds the Solution: Utah's Hybrid Alternative to Water Markets,
13 J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES, & ENVrL. L. 159, 202-205 (1993).
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III. Two CASE STUDIES OF SECRETARY BABBITT'S EFFORTS

The preceding section described how voluntariness, participation, identification of interests, and the development of options are fundamental characteristics of a successful dispute resolution process. This section, applying the
above characteristics, analyzes Secretary Babbitt's efforts to develop consensus about environmental policy. It draws from two contrasting case studies.
The first concerns a dispute that arose in Alaska between local fishermen and
oil companies. Here the process satisfied all of the attributes, and Babbitt was
able to successfully resolve the dispute. The second case study examines his
repeated efforts to reform grazing policies on federal land. Babbitt has struggled primarily because his processes have lacked the characteristics needed
for a successful dispute resolution process.
A. Case Study #1: Babbitt Mediates Alaska Fishermen's Battle With Oil
Companies
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran aground on
Bly Reef, contaminating one of the country's most sensitive ecosystems
with approximately eleven million gallons of crude oil.53 The spill, the
largest in the history of the United States, devastated wildlife in the
Prince William Sound, and scientists may not know the full effect of the
damage for many years."' In the wake of the spill, Exxon pleaded guilty
to four misdemeanors under three federal environmental laws, and settled
a civil suit with the federal government for $900 million.55 Although the
image of oil covered otters has receded from the public's mind, for the
seine fishermen who make their living in the Prince William Sound, the
fight against Exxon has grown more desperate. During the past three
years, pink salmon runs have collapsed, and many fishermen face bankruptcy. They may ultimately win their private claims against Exxon, but
their cases have not been finally resolved.56 In August of 1993, their

53. See generally Hodgson, Alaska's Big Spill-Can the Wilderness Heal?, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 1990, at 5.
54. Id. at 26.
55. FederalJudge Accepts $1 Billion Settlement, Ends Two-year Litigation in Exxon
Oil Spill, BNA, ENV. REPORTER, Oct. 11, 1991, Vol. 22 No. 24, at 1533. The three environmental laws were the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 to 1387 (1988), the Refuse
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 to
715 (1988). Id. As part of the guilty plea, Exxon was assessed criminal fines and restitution of $250 million, but the Justice Department said it agreed to "remit" to Exxon $125
million in recognition of the money already "voluntarily spent by Exxon to address the
consequences of the spill." Id.
56. The fishermen have won some early rounds in their litigation. In August, a federal
jury awarded over $286.7 million to commercial fishermen for compensatory damages. 24
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struggle against Exxon erupted into a face-to-face showdown with the oil
companies in the Valdez Narrows. This section describes the events that
led to the showdown, and how Bruce Babbitt, acting as a mediator, was
able to resolve the situation.
Dismal pink salmon harvests in the years following the oil spill
have mired the seine fishermen in a deep recession. Pink salmon runs
historically produced approximately 20 million fish annually, but the
expected catch for 1993 was less than 5 million. 7 In monetary terms
the 1993 harvest was expected to be worth less than $2.5 million,
down from an average of more than $30 million in the late 1980s.5 In
1992, the harvest was less than 10 million pink salmon. 9 And while
the 1991 harvest was listed at 37 million, on paper one of the largest
in history, the harvest was largely wasted due to a chemical deformity
that disrupted the harvest and processing.' ° Consequently, hundreds of
Prince William Sound fishermen now face bankruptcy and the loss of
their livelihoods. 6 They are at the mercy of banks and lending agencies who hold mortgage notes on their fishing boats.62 A "position
In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-00995-CV (lmH) (D. AlasENvTL. L. REP. 10335 (1994) (citing
ka Aug. 11, 1994)). In September, the jury awarded $5 billion in punitive damages. Thomas S.
Mulligan & Michael Parrish, Exxon Ordered toPay $5 Billion for Oil Spill, L.A. TIMES, September 17, 1994, at Al. The fishermen have also suffered some defeats: the district court dismissed thefishermen's claims based on decreased salmon prices and the decreased value of
their fishing permits and vessels and dismissed the claims by local fishing businesses because
they failed toshow a connection between physical damage from the oil spill and economic losses. 24 ENVrL. L. REP. 10335 (1994) (citing In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-00995-CV
(HRH) (D. Alaska Max. 23, 1994)).
57. Hal Bernton & Lisa Scagliotti, Sound salmon run crashes, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 18, 1993, at Al.
58. Id.
59. Brian Bue, Stephen Fried, Samuel Sharr & Mark Willette, Pinks in Peril:Declining
Wild Stocks in Prince Wliam Sound, ALASKA'S WILDLIFE, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 34, 35.
60. Tony Bickert, Protest shuts port, may be repeated, VALDEZ VANGUARD, Aug.
26, 1993, at 1, 8. Because of the chemical deformity, the pink salmon began their spawning runs late and strayed from natal streams. Scientists believe this behavior was probably
caused by "oil-related damage to olfactory tissue, imprinting mechanism or confusion of
chemical cues." Dr. Riki Ott & Prof. Rick Steiner, Background Information Concerning
the Long-Term Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on Prince William Sound Fisheries,
Sept. 21, 1993 (paper on file with author). Because the fish were three weeks late when
they finally found their way, their meat had spoiled and fisherman could not profit from
the run. Bickert, supra note 60, at 8.
61. The poor fishing affected the local economy because "there's no money in
town, so nobody's buying." See Bernton & Scagliotti, supra note 57, at A1, A8. In addition, the seine fishermen were suffering from failed herring runs. Ellen Lockyer, Pink
Jitters in PWS, ALASKA FISHERMAN'S J., Sept. 1993, at 11.

62. Hall Bernton, Another Depressing Run in Prince William Sound Has Fishermen
Sinking, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1993, at A3. Some financial problems were caused when
fisherman chartered boats to Exxon during the oil spill cleanup and used the money to buy
expensive new boats as part of a tax shelter. Now those fishermen are squeezed between
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statement" at a community meeting on August 17, 1993 expressed
their emotions:
We are stunned and angry as we now shoulder the third successive run failure of pink salmon to the Sound. We are still reeling
from the failure of herring to return to the Sound this spring.
Prince William Sound is sick and as a consequence our families,
our way of life, and communities are in serious jeopardy. 3
The fishermen blamed the Exxon Valdez spill for the Sound's ailing
pink salmon runs." Exxon contended that the spill had "no measurable
short- or long-term impact on the Sound pink salmon population" and that
Exxon has "no intentions" to respond to the fishermen's demands.'s
Finally, faced with Exxon's stonewalling and exasperated with the fishing
returns,' the fishermen decided to organize a protest to bring attention to
big boat payments and low fish harvests. Others bought fishing permits during the late
1980s when permits cost about $280,000. Today the value of an Alaska fishing permit has
plummeted to about $60,000. Id.
63. Position Statement/Fisherman's Meeting of 8/17/93 (on file with author).
64. In spite of the precipitous drop in pink salmon runs, scientists have struggled to
identify a link between the oil spill and the poor runs. See Bue et al., supra note 59, at 35.
65. Bickert, supra note 60, at 8. Exxon repeatedly argues that the pink salmon runs were
not affected by the oil spill, pointing to the high harvests in 1990 and 1991, which totaled 44
million and 37 million. These harvest numbers, however, are deceptive. Elevated ocean temperatures and abundant food in 1989 and 1990 led to large adult runs in 1990 and 1991. Nevertheless, the 1990 record harvest was 20-25% lower than expected because of the oil spill. Ott &
Steiner, supra note 60; see also Bue et all, supranote 59, at 35. Exxon also contends that since
80% of pink salmon are hatchery fish, which were unaffected by the spill, "[tihe oil spill could
not account for these low returns." Bickert, supra note 59; see also Ellen Lockyer, Seiners Shut
the Valve in Valdez, ALASKA FISHERMAN'S J., Oct 1993, at 16, 31. This argument is flawed in
several respects as well. First, the hatchery fish swam through the spill area during migration.
Bickert, supra note 60, at 8. Second, pink salmon have a two year life cycle. Fish caught in the
1992 harvest, which was less than 30% of normal, migrated through the oil in 1989. Ott &
Steiner, supra note 60. Finally, Exxon argues that both ocean temperatures and food abundance
were low during the 1991 year. While scientists agree that these would affect harvest levels,
unfavorable natural conditions do not account for the extremely low harvests in 1992 and 1993.
Bue et al., supra note 59, at 35.
Exxon also argues that it has voluntarily addressed the fishermen's legitimate
claims, and any additional compensation will have to be obtained through the court system.
Lockyer, supra note 65, at 31. Exxon had paid a total of $300 million to fishermen for
damages and has paid another $80 million to charter boats and operators during the cleanup. Bickert, supra note 60, at 8.
66. A press release by the fishermen described the frustrations that led to their
blockade of the Valdez narrows:
This year, due to unprecedented low fish returns, [Prince William Sound] fishermen were
confined to fishing areas that look like postage stamps. Today's demonstration was conceived 3 days ago, while frustrated fishermen repeatedly waited in 6 hour lines for a 30
minute trmn to catch a bag of fish worth less than the fuel they burned to catch them.
Press Release by Prince William Sound Fishermen, Aug. 20, 1993 (on file with author).
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their plight. 7 By blockading the Valdez Narrows, a skinny passageway
through which tankers must pass to reach the oil terminal at the end of
the trans-Alaska pipeline, the fishermen hoped to obtain three objectives.
First, they wanted the federal government and Alaska to offer financial
assistance to help carry them through this difficult situation. Second, they
wanted assurances that some of the money from the Exxon settlement
fund will be used to study the damaged pink salmon runs and begin meaningful restoration.6" And third, they wanted Exxon to "genuinely undertake to address their legal responsibilities to the fishermen and communities they have injured." 69
On August 20, 1993, approximately eighty-seven boats, many of
them carrying signs that read "No more Exxon lies," strung across the
Narrows. Their target was an Exxon tanker, the Baton Rouge. The fishermen planned to break up the blockade when the tanker approached, then
escort the tanker into Port Valdez. But the Baton Rouge had been forewarned and failed to make its scheduled run into port. After learning that
Exxon had delayed passage of the Baton Rouge, the fisherman decided to
expand the protest to block all tankers. What started as a symbolic protest
had turned into a white-knuckle standoff. The next day British Petroleum
tried to send through its tanker, the Atigun Pass. After coming within five
miles of the phalanx of fishing ships, the tanker turned around.
By Saturday afternoon, the situation was nearing a critical stage at
the Valdez Marin Terminal. Three tankers waited in the Prince William
Sound, and three more were scheduled to arrive on Sunday. The oil
storage tanks, which were nearing capacity, could only hold a couple of
days of oil supplied by the trans-Alaskan pipeline.7' Had they filled,
Alyeska would have been forced to shut down the pipeline, which has not
been attempted since the pipeline was constructed. Given the seriousness
of the situation, representatives of the fishermen met with representatives
of Arco and British Petroleum, as well as with Governor Hickel of Alaska. Exxon officials refused to participate in the negotiations. The meeting
at the city council chambers ended in a shouting match with the fishermen
still demanding that they meet with Exxon.7
67. My description of the showdown, unless otherwise stated, comes from Bickert,
supra note 60, and Lockyer, supra note 65, at 16.
68. A recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) report found that most of the
settlement money spent had either gone to reimbursing state and federal agencies for cleanup costs or administrative costs. See GAO, Natural Resources Restoration: Use of Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill Settlement Funds, Aug. 20, 1993, at 3; see also Pamela A. Miller, Misspending Oil-Spill Money in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at A15.
69. Position Statement/Fishermen's Meeting of 8/17/93 (on file with author).
70. Bickert, supra note 60, at 8.
71. The information about the meetings with ARCO and British Petroleum repre-
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After receiving an urgent call from Governor Hickel, Babbitt flew in
Sunday morning to mediate the dispute. Babbitt immediately kicked the press
out of the meetings, ending the posturing by the fishermen and oil company
representatives. After meeting first with the fishermen and learning of their
plight and demands, Babbitt then met separately with the Alaskan officials
and oil company representatives. Although Exxon still refused to come to the
bargaining table, by Sunday afternoon Babbitt helped the fishermen and other
parties resolve the standoff. The fishermen agreed to lift the blockade. In
return Governor Hickel pledged to look for ways to obtain financial aid for
the fishermen. Both Governor Hickel and Babbitt promised to "urge federal
and state trustees who oversee the $900 million civil spill settlement fund to
buy more land to protect salmon-spawning streams in Prince William Sound
and to aid local hatcheries." And Babbitt vowed to press Exxon to meet with
the fishermen about their pending lawsuits. 7'
By helping the parties end the blockade, Bruce Babbitt made both
parties better off.73 Babbitt succeeded because the process satisfied the
four attributes described in Part I. Unlike the grazing controversy, however, Babbitt was not the architect of the process. Instead, he was an
outsider thrown into the role of mediator. First, voluntariness was satisfied because the parties were free to participate or leave, and set their
own agenda. Although the parties pressured each other into negotiation,
Babbitt himself did not use the government's leverage and influence to
coerce negotiation or a "consensus." Second, nobody was excluded from
the process who wanted to participate. Fortunately, the parties who did
participate found a way to end the blockade. Finally, by kicking out the
press, the participating parties were able to discuss interests and develop
options that satisfied their respective needs.

sentatives came from an interview with a fisherman who participated in the protest and
negotiations, Wash. D.C. (Mar. 15, 1994).
72. Fishermen to Lift Oil Blockade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at B7.
73. Both the oil companies and the fishermen gained by ending the blockade. The
oil companies who negotiated with the fishermen gained because had the fishermen continued the blockade much longer, Aleyeska would have been forced to shut down the pipeline. See Bickert, supra note 60, at 8. Although Exxon refused to negotiate or recognize
the fishermen's claims, the fishermen achieved their other goals-promises from state and
federal officials to help alleviate their financial crisis and to improve fishing runs. See
supra text accompanying note 68. In addition, ending the blockade probably spared the
fishermen up to $25,000 in fines and up to six years in prison. Lockyer, supra note 65, at
19. Although the Coast Guard threatened to charge the fishermen with violating 10 civil
and criminal laws, see letter from United States Coast Guard to Jim Gray, Sept. 8. 1993
(on file with author), the Coast Guard decided to avoid the spectacle of "74 people
tum[ing] themselves in to be put in jail in front of national television." Blockade fishermen
may face fines from Coast Guard, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 1993, at El (statement by Jim Gray, a Cordova seine fisherman).
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On the other hand, Babbitt obviously did not resolve the larger
dispute between the fishermen and Exxon concerning the health of the
Sound and whether Exxon should take responsibility for any damage.
This, however, was not the result of a faulty process. Exxon simply
decided that litigation rather than negotiation was their best alternative.74
B. Case Study #2: Babbitt's Attempt to Implement Grazing Reform
This case study describes a controversy between western ranchers
and environmentalists. Although both ranchers and environmentalists
believe that there are problems with the current grazing rules, Secretary Babbitt has not found much common ground. Unlike the dispute
in Alaska, both sides are skeptical of Babbitt's plan calling for local
ranchers and environmentalists to reach a consensus on how to manage
grazing. Consensus has been elusive partly because the legions of
ranchers and numerous environmental groups do not each speak with
one voice.75 Moreover, there is not a mechanism to create representation for the various interests. Consequently, it is difficult if not impossible to establish a process in which all the affected interests participate and control the outcome. Nevertheless, Babbitt's failure to
achieve consensus stems primarily from the use of a flawed dispute
resolution process."

74. In other words, Exxon believed its Best Alternative to Negotiated Action
was unilateral action (i.e., refusing to negotiate). For an explanation of BATNA, see
infra note 156. Although Exxon's decision prevented all the parties from negotiating, their action is not a "barrier to cooperative dispute resolution" as defined in
this article. See supra note 18.
75. See infra note 47; see also BACOW & WHEELER, supra note 12; SUssKIND &
CRUIKSHANK, supra note 18, at 101-04 (commenting on the difficulty of finding a representative who has the authority to bind the group for which he speaks); see also Mnookin
& Ross, supra note 17 (manuscript at 33) (describing the institutional barrier created when
an interest groups which stands to lose a great deal of money has a conflict with a group
who faces less tangible, non-monetary gains and loses).
76. Some environmentalists believe that Babbitt has failed because he raised
expectations and anxieties by initially setting "sky-high" goals. Joan Hamilton, Babbitt's Retreat. SIERRA, July/August 1994, at 53, 76. Other environmentalists contend that Babbitt has failed because he has tried to achieve reform without alienating
any ranchers or other opponents of reform. Id. at 75. Others blame President Clinton
for Babbitt's troubles, or at least hold the President partly responsible. Id. at 57
("Without the President solidly behind him, the noble knight of the environmental
movement started to look more like a political pawn"; also quoting President Clinton
telling Babbitt not "to take any actions that will change [the politics in Montana].");
see also Chip Brown, Bruce Babbitt, Alone in the Wilderness, OUTSIDE, Oct. 1994, at
65, 70, 71; Timothy Egan, Interior Secretary Endures Storms From All Directions,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1994, at See. 4, Page 3 (describing how Babbitt "has had
little, if any, help from President Clinton").
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1. The sources of controversy: the condition of Western rangelands
and the control of grazing management.
Environmentalists believe that Western ranchers should take better
care of Western rangelands. Although the cattle industry contributes jobs,
a supply of meat, and other products to our society, environmentalists
assert that excessive grazing has caused severe environmental damage.'
They contend that grazing has caused desertification on as much as ten
percent of western lands,78 and that cows have trampled native vegetation,
causing erosion and filling streams with sediment. 79 Ranchers reply that
the damage to Western rangelands is less than environmentalists claim,
and that they are in better shape now than in the past.80
Environmental degradation from grazing became a casus belli for
environmentalists during the Sagebrush rebellion and the James Watt era
in the Interior Department. 8' Although the Sagebrush rebellion failed to
achieve its primary goal, private ownership of federal lands,'I ranchers
dominated the BLM and influenced its management of grazing on federal
lands.8 3 For example, ranchers sit on "grazing advisory boards" which
77. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON
WESTERN RIPARIAN AREAS 5-6 (1990); D. FERGUSON & N. FERGUSON, SACRED
Cows AT THE PUBLIC TROUGH, CH. 16 (1983); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrry, EXEcUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 182 (1970);
Wuerthner, Public Lands Grazing: What Benefits at What Costs?, WESTERN
WILDLANDS, Fall 1989, at 24.
In addition to the environmental degradation caused by trampling and erosion, Western agriculture uses an enormous amount of irrigation water for cow pasture and winter feed. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, THE EAGLE BIRD: MAPPING A
NEW WEST 148-49 (1992); Mark Reisner, The Emerald Desert, GREENPEACE, July/August 1989, at 6. The National Wildlife Federation alleges that grazing has put
76 species in danger of extinction and harms an additional 270 species. Steve
Yozwiak, Report: Wildlife at Risk- 'Abusive' Grazing Threatens 76 Species, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, June 6, 1994, at BI.
78. Deserification is defined as the loss of topsoil due to erosion and wind, salinization
of surface water, and loss of native vegetation. WILKINSON, supra note 29, at 80.
79. For a specific example of how erosion caused by poor grazing management
fitled up an entire reservoir with a million tons of sediment, see id., at 75-80 (discussing
the Severance Reservoir in Oregon).
80. See e.g., Bill Laycock, ProposalBased on Faulty Assumptions, WESTERN BEEF
PRODUCER, Oct. 2, 1993, at 53 ("current ecological research indicates that most Western
rangelands have improved from their deteriorated condition at the turn of the century to a
current 'stable state' ... ).
81. George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, 'Nothing Beside Remains:' The
Legal Legacy of James G. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of the Interioron FederalLand Law
and Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473 (1990).
82. State of Nevada ex rel. Nevada State Board of Agriculture v. United States, 512
F. Supp. 166 (D.Nev. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983).
83. WILKINSON, supra note 29, at 100.
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review applications and set local grazing standards for federal lands.' To
no avail, the environmentalists denounced the boards as "a classic case of
the fox guarding the chicken coop: ranchers deciding how to develop
federal lands for ranching."' In addition, the BLM limited public participation in permit renewal decisions."
While ranchers used the BLM to advance their interests, conflict
with environmentalists intensified. Ignored and spurned by the Reagan
administration's policies, environmentalists resorted to the courts to advance their interests. They found it difficult, however, to legally challenge
the BLM's hands-off approach because there was no legal claim under the7
three relevant statutes, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,8
the Taylor Grazing Act,8 and the Public Rangeland Improvement Act.89
The courts ruled that judges would not be a "range-master" and left
grazing conflict to the BLM and to political battles.9
As the anti-environmental momentum of the Reagan era wound
down, environmentalists turned to Congress to combat what they perceived to be abusive grazing practices. Ironically, the conservative economic philosophies of the 1980s gave environmentalists a weapon: Ranchers receive a large subsidy from arguably low grazing fees. Federal agencies charge $1.97 for grazing permits, and equivalent permit on private
lands would cost roughly $8.70. 9' This subsidy, environmentalists argued,
84. The grazing advisory boards were created by the Taylor Grazing Act, 43
U.S.C. § 315o-1 (1988). They were reauthorized by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act in 43 U.S.C. § 1753 (1988).
85. Melissa Healy, Big Hike in Federal Grazing Fees Proposed by Babbitt, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at Al.
86. Joseph M. Feller, Grazing Management on the PublicLands: Opening the Process to Public Participation,26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 582-86 (1991).
87. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1988).
88. Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315(r) (1988).
89. Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-08 (1988).
90. NRDC IIv. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1062 (D. Nev. 1985), aff'd, 819 F.2d
927 (9th Cir. 1987). Although the environmentalists won an important case in NRDC v.
Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), there has been little grazing litigation. Recently, however, environmentalists have brought lawsuits to tighten federal government oversight of grazing. Michael Riley, Courts become weapon for change, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, June 28, 1994, at Al, A8. An Interior Department judge has ruled that the BLM
must remove all cows from Wash Comb in Southern Utah until the BLM completes an
environmental impact statement and explicitly decides that grazing in those canyons is in
the public interest. Id. Feller v. Bureau of Land Management, 128 IBLA 231, 232 (1994).
Although environmentalists are bringing similar actions in other states, the BLM has not
changed its grazing policies outside of the Wash Comb allotment. Michael Riley, Impact in
Wyoming may be some time in coming, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, June 28, 1994, at Al, A8.
91. See, e.g., Congress Threatens to Cut "Cowboy Welfare," DENVER PoST, July
7, 1991, at A12, A13. For a listing of private grazing land lease rates in every state, see
58 Fed Reg. 14315, Mar. 25, 1994. Federal grazing fees are also considerable lower than
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distorts the marketplace and causes unnecessary environmental destruction. With the national debt shooting past one trillion dollars, environmentalists galvanized support and stung ranchers with the charge of "cowboy welfare."' Although the environmentalists were able to generate significant national support for a change in the operation of federal grazing
lands, ranchers still swayed the hearts and minds of Western senators.
Several times the House of Representatives passed legislation increasing
grazing fees, but each time the Senate blocked the reform effort.93
Ranchers vehemently fought efforts to raise grazing fees because
many small family ranching operations are barely economically viable.
Any hike in grazing prices, they contended, would force many ranches
out of business and even change the culture of the American West.94
Ranchers also fought any attempt to reduce the amount of grazing allowed
per permit because it would affect the value of their ranches. Federal
grazing permits are usually sold with the ranch land, and ranches are
typically valued on the Animal Unit Months (AUMs), not acreage.'

If

state fees. Id. The history of low grazing fees is recounted in George Cameron Coggins &
Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons
and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVrL. L. 1, 62-64, 71-75 (1982). Ranchers argue that grazing
fees should be lower than fees associated with private lands because private lands are
usually more fertile, Jill Lawrence, War on the West, THE SHERIDAN PRESS, June 7, 1994,
at BI; and that there are "non-fee costs" of grazing on public lands, Katherine Walsh,
Wyoming student talks about rangeland reforms with President Clinton, THE WYOMING
EAGLE, Mar. 23, 1994, at 5. Non-fee costs associated with public land grazing include:
fencing, roads, water development, and other improvements; higher livestock moving,
herding, and veterinary fees and costs; more lost animals; grazing association fees; administrative costs associated with interactions with federal bureaucracies. L. ALLEN
TORELL ET AL., THE VALUE OF PUBLIC LAND FORAGE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
GRAZING FEE POLICY (New Mexico State University College of Agriculture and Home
Economics, Bulletin 767, Dec. 1993).
92. Melissa Healy, Way Clearedfor Interior to Raise Grazing Fees, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1993, at A23.
93. WILKINSON, supra note 29, at 100-01.
94. Frank Clifford, Ecologists and Ranchers Try to Mend Fences, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 6 1993, at Al. A New Mexico study found that most public-land ranchers eam under
$20,000 annually. Id. See also Michael Riley, UW Study: Grazing Fee hike would hurt
Wyo ranches, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Apr. 3, 1994, at AIO. But see id. (citing research
effort by professors from several Western universities that found the market value is 1.5 to
2.5 times the value of grazing fees); id. at A10 (citing BLM study showing hike in grazing
fees would cut ranching profits by less than 15 %); Michael Riley, UW: Economic impacts
of graze plan minimal, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, July 15, 1994, at AI (finding that Babbitt's grazing fee increase would decrease economic activity of the ranching industry by
less than 2 percent).
95. See PHILIP 0. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1960). An animal unit month, or AUM, is the equivalent of one cow with
a calf grazing for a month-about 800 pounds of grass. Mitchel P. McClaran, Livestock in Wi!derness: A Review and Forecast, 20 ENVrL. L. 857, 859 (1990) (citing BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 24-27 (1988)).
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AUMs are reduced, it will proportionately reduce the value of a ranch,
which also affects ranchers' ability to get loans from banks. 96
After several years of range wars, the election of a Democratic
administration portended a break in the stalemate. Environmentalists saw
their opportunity to finally take the management of public lands out of the
grip of special interests. Ranchers tightened their saddle, preparing for
what they believed to be another challenge to their way of life.
The first attempt to reform grazing policies by the Clinton Administration was a strategy of direct confrontation. As part of his budget proposal to Congress early in 1993, President Clinton swung his budget ax at
long-established subsidies for natural resource extraction on federal
lands. 7 One target was grazing fees, where Clinton proposed raising the
price for an AUM from $1.86 to 4.26.98 This strategy seemed particularly
ripe given the mood of the country and politicians. Congress was finally
ready to take deficit reduction seriously, and it appeared that even special
interests would have to contribute their share. 9 Environmentalists were
particularly hopeful because they had long believed the best way to dilute
the power of influential lobbyists was to package reforms into an enormous budget bill."°
Hope for a quick strike at grazing reform was short-lived. President
Clinton's budget proposal, facing unanimous opposition from congressional Republicans and well as criticism from moderate Democrats, nearly
collapsed. The press raised the political stakes by predicting a doomed
Clinton Administration if the budget package failed.'' With Clinton in
desperate need of votes, several western Democratic senators took advantage of the President's weak bargaining position and demanded that
96. Coggins & Lindberg-Johnson, supra note 91, at 74; Michael Riley, Ranchers:
Range reforms too extreme, economically harmful, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, May 18, 1994,
at Al, A10.

97. The President's proposal would have produced savings of over $1 billion by
raising the federal royalty charged for mineral extraction, phasing out below-cost timber
sales, and increasing public land grazing fees paid by cattle ranchers. See Michael
Weisskopf & Ann Devroy, Clinton Bows to Westerners on Higher Fees, WASH. POST,
Mar. 31, 1993, at Al.
98. This was still considerably lower than the cost of grazing cows on private land,
approximately $8 to $12 per AUM. See John Balzar, Babbitt Resumes Work on Grazing
Policy Reform, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1993, at A4.
99. See Clinton's News Conference, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1993, at 18.
100. Weisskopf & Devroy, supra note 97, at Al. Babbitt changed the process by
first holding hearings and then publishing a proposed rule in the Federal Register. Congress tried to enact Babbitt's proposal, but could not overcome a filibuster in the Senate.
See infra note 112.
101. See generally Richard L. Berke, Looking for Alliance, Clinton Courts the Congress Nonstop, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1.
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Clinton drop the higher fees." ° To the dismay of environmentalists,
Clinton hastily agreed to their demand," 3 and four months later Congress
passed the modified budget without a single vote to spare. I04
2. A semi-flawed process, little consensus.
After President Clinton backed away from a budget battle over
higher grazing fees, newly appointed Secretary Babbitt announced a
"change in process." 5 Babbitt would still seek to raise grazing fees; but
rather than force a confrontation in Congress, he would hold hearings to
search for a "reasonable consensus" between ranchers and environmentalists.lt° A seasoned politician, son of a cattleman, and experienced consensus-builder,1 " Babbitt was an ideal candidate to try to achieve consensus
about grazing reform. He vowed "to change the tone of the debate from
the 'range wars' of recent years to what he called 'a good solid consensus
about how all of us live in this extraordinary land of the West."'10 He
repeatedly stressed that full public participation was the way to develop a
"shared vision of the land on a local level." '9
After several months of round-table hearings,"' Babbitt announced his new proposal for grazing reform."' The centerpiece was a

102. The western senators, led by Senator Baucus of Montana, publicly denied that
they had in fact traded their vote on the budget package in exchange for a removal of the
higher fees. Weisskopf & Devroy, supra note 97.
103. Representative George Miller, chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee, blasted Clinton for "absolutely spoonfeeding the special interests." Id. Jay Hair,
president of the National Wildlife Federation, said their romance with President Clinton
had turned into "date rape." Timothy Egan, Clinton Under Crossfire at Logging Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, at 6.
104. As it turned out, President Clinton needed every vote: Vice President Gore had to
cast thebie-breaking vote in the Senate. Votes inCongress, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at 42.
105. Weisskopf & Devroy, supra note 97, at Al. Babbitt changed the process by first
holding hearings and then publishing a proposed rule in the Federal Register. Congress tried to
enact Babbitt's proposal, but could not overcome a Senate filibuster. See nfra note 112.
106. Tom Kenworthy, Stepping Carefully into Public Land Grazing: Babbitt Using
Hearings to Seek 'Reasonable Consensus' Between Cattlemen, Environmentalists, WASH.
POST, May 2, 1993, at AS; Ed Marston, Focus on the land, not the money, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 23, 1993, at 15.
107. See supra note 4.
108. John Christensen, Bruce Babbitt on Western land use: 1993 is the "yearof decision, " HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 17, 1993, at 8. See also Bruce Babbitt, Remarks to the
Society of Range Management, 29 LAND & WATER L. REv. 399, 400, 405 (1994).
109. Id.
110. Kenworthy, supra note 9, at Fl.
111. 58 Fed. Reg. 43208, Aug. 13, 1993; see also Melissa Healy, Big Hike in Federal Grazing Fees Proposed by Babbitt, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at Al; Tom
Kenworthy, U.S. to ighten Grazing Rules, Increase Fees on Public Lands, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 1993, at Al.
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hike in grazing fees from $1.86 to $3.96, phased in over three years.
In addition, Babbitt proposed eliminating the BLM's "grazing advisory
boards' and replacing them with "resource advisory councils" composed of ranchers, wildlife managers, fisheries experts, environmentalists and local business owners; making the renewal of grazing permits
contingent on a rancher's record of environmental stewardship; and
reclaiming federal control over any new water rights. Although
Babbitt's proposal easily passed in the House of Representatives, a
senators again stymied the grazing reform proposmajority of western
112
al in the Senate.
The round table hearings, like the 1989 Pacific Northwest timber
summit,"' failed to achieve consensus because, although the parties
could express their views, they did not have control over the final outcome. Without voluntariness, the parties perceived the process as adversarial. This led to political posturing rather than a search for common interests and possible solutions." 4 Nor did the hearings contain
any real opportunity for a collaborative search for creative options.
They were primarily composed of testimony by academics and personal testimonials by ranchers."' The participants characterized them as
political "talk shows" that had little substance." 6 Babbitt's own state112. By a wide margin of 59-40, the Senate passed an amendment to the Interior
appropriations bill, which barred the Interior Department from spending money to implement the proposed policy for one year. 139 CONG. REc. Si 1692-02, Sept. 14, 1993; see
also Tom Kenworthy, Babbitt's Grazing Fee Increase Unsaddled by Westerners' Rider,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1993, atA16. Because the House and Senate appropriation bills
differed, the issue went to a conference committee, where House and Senate negotiators
agreed to lower the grazing fee increase to $3.45 per AUM. 139 CONG. REC. H8052, Oct.
15, 1993; see also Melissa Healy, Lawmakers OK Plan to Double U.S. Grazing Fees,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at A3. Ranching interests denounced the conference
committee's compromise, claiming it will "devastate tens of thousands of ranch families
who have for over a century provided stewardship on the public land and food and fiber
for this nation." Id. Once the conference committee's compromise bill came to the floor of
the Senate, it died in a filibuster organized by Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.). The
Senate vote was 54-44, six votes short of the necessary two-thirds majority needed to
break a filibuster. 139 CONG. REC. S14583-03, Oct. 28, 1993; see also Tom Kenworthy &
Eric Pianin, Showdown on Grazing Fees: Babbitt Acts After Filibuster Vote Fails, WASH.
Posr, Oct. 29, 1993, at Al.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
114. The lack of voluntariness and posturing was reflected in the comments of Lee
Oteni, assistant New Mexico state land commissioner: "If all the hearings have been as terrible as this one, getting rid of the polarity will be hard. What I heard was people trying to
posture, on both sides." Christensen, supra note 108, at 9. Thus these hearings did not
resemble a dispute resolution process. Instead, they turned into an adversarial process
where the parties advocated "extreme positions before a decisionmaker." Harter, supra
note 37, at 29.
115. Kenworthy, supra note 106, at AS.
116. Balzar, supra note 98, at A4.
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ments reflected a strategy designed to overcome opposition rather than
one designed to help the parties find consensus.'
Although his process failed to achieve consensus, Babbitt's objective
probably was not consensus. He was a believer in the "New West" theory, the idea that ranching, mining, and other extractive industries no
longer dominate western politics, and that urbanites who recreate on
public lands and enjoy their scenic beauty would make it easier to achieve
environmental reforms."' Using round-table hearings, Babbitt hoped to
pacify the ranching community by allowing them to express their views.
Instead it triggered a firestorm of protest, not only from ranchers but
from other industry users of the public land as well." 9 After this phase of
grazing reform ended in legislative defeat, Babbitt stated, "I thought this
time it might be easier to get things done. The Western press, the economic community, a lot of people seemed to be in favor of it. But obviously that was not entirely the case.""0
After this legislative defeat, Babbitt vowed to implement his
grazing reform proposal administratively. ' 2' Democratic Western governors and senators, however, were mounting pressure on President
Clinton to slow Babbitt's aggressive grazing reform efforts." They
argued that Babbitt was jeopardizing Clinton's fortunes in states like
Nevada, Montana, New Mexico, and Colorado, where Clinton won
narrow victories in traditional Republican strongholds. 2 1 Moreover,
conservative Westerners have labeled Babbitt a liberal James Watt,

117. Babbitt pronounced, "I'm going to be back in Montana talking until everyone's
so tired of talking that they have nothing left to say." Id. This is similar to a political
strategy made famous by Senator Muskie-the last one sitting at the table wins the political
fight. CHRISTOPHER MATHEWS,

HARDBALL: How POLITICS IS PLAYED-TOLD BY ONE

WHO KNOWS THE GAME 134 (1986).
118. Governor Bruce Babbitt, Foreward, in WILKINSON, supra note 77, at ix; see
also Frank Clifford, Maverick Babbitt Mending Fences on Range Reform, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 1993, at Al. Charles Wilkinson is the source of the "New West" theory. See
WILKINSON, supra note 29; WILKINSON, supra note 77.

119. Kenworthy, supra note 9, at FI.
120. Id.
121. Kenworthy & Pianin, supra note 112, at Al. The administration has the authority to unilaterally raise grazing fees, but in order to do so, it must proceed through a
lengthy rule-making process. An administrative approach also is vulnerable to future legal
battles in the courts. See Melissa Healy, Way Clearedfor Interior to Raise Grazing Fees,
L.A. TIMES, SOUTHLAND EDITION, Nov. 10, 1993, at A23.
122. Kenworthy, supra note 9,at Fl; see also John Balzar, Babbitt Resumes Work
on Grazing Policy Reform, L.A. TIMES, May 1,1993, at A4 ("the President instructed
him to devise a plan that is especially sensitive to family ranchers").
123. Clinton won those four states by less than a total of 140,000 votes. Tom
Kenworthy, Western States Get Mixed Environmental Signals From Interior, WASH. POST,
Feb. 18, 1994, at A19.
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fomenting a serious counterattack reminiscent of the Sagebrush Rebellion of the early 1980s." z
Consequently, when Governor Roy Romer of Colorado organized a
closed-door meeting for Babbitt with a small group of environmentalists
and ranchers who claimed they could solve his grazing reform problems,
Babbitt offered to scrap his reform proposal,"z and begin a new process
in which consensus was the genuine goal." Instead of seeking to achieve
consensus among Washington interest groups, Babbitt sought consensus at
the local level-"consensus on the ground." 27 The small cadre of environmentalists and ranchers, who had years of experience working together
in Gunnison, Colorado, convinced Babbitt that grazing reform could be
better accomplished through a consensus at the community level rather
than imposing national standards.'28 Babbitt agreed to use the Colorado
experience as a model, 129 hold another series of round-table hearings to
124. See Frank Clifford, Maverick Babbitt Mending Fences on Range Reform, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1993, at Al; Kenworthy, supra note 9. Attacks by Republican politicians
have been the most vitriolic. See Clinton's War on the West,, May 26, 1994 at 1-3 (Issue
Brief by House Republican Conference) (on file with author): Wyo GOP candidatespush
'war' campaign, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, May 26, 1994, Jill Lawrence, War on the
West, THE SHERIDAN PRESS, June 7, 1994 at BI. For a response, see John Lawrence,
There's no 'war on the West' DENVER PosT, July 2, 1994, at 7B.
125. Steve Hinchman, Babbitt seeks local approachto grazing reform, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Nov. 29, 1993. at 3. Babbitt met nine different times with Colorado ranchers, environmentalists, and other state and local officials. He conducted similar follow up meetings in Idaho,
Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, New Mexico, and Wyoming. 58 Fed. Reg. 14315 (1994).
126. Babbitt stated that "his earlier push to impose sweeping reforms from Washington was a mistake.. . ." Elliot Diringer, New Babbitt Plan On Grazing Rules Ranchers,
environmentalists would work out standards together, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 18, 1994, at A3.
In addition, Babbitt's seriousness about consensus building was evinced by his ousting of
BLM director Jim Baca, a favorite of national environmental organizations. Baca's "inyour-face" style conflicted too much with Babbitt's efforts to work with Western governors
and ranching interests. According to Babbitt, they had "different approaches to management style and consensus building." Melissa Healy, BLM DirectorSteps Down After Disputes With Western Officials, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at A15.
127. Steve Hinclman, Ranchers' clout drives grazing reform in new directions, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 1, 11 (statement by Stephanie Hanna, spokeswoman of
Interior Department).
128. Babbitt, supra note 108, at 402. Babbitt believes the Gunnison model is taking root
in many parts of the West, including the Trout Creek Mountain working group in eastern Oregon, the Owl Mountain CRM in Colorado, and the Sun Ranch CRM in Wyoming. Id. at 401.
129. The Colorado Rangeland Reform Working Group identified seven goals:
(1) Healthy and sustainable rangeland ecosystems, (2) healthy, sustainable and diverse
economies and communities (3) accountability of management and users of public lands to
broad public goals, (4) efficient and effective management of our public lands, (5) fostering
mutual respect among public land users, (6) encouraging the retention of private land open
space, and (7) ensuring public lands are managed to comply with federal laws.
58 Fed. Reg. 14317 (1994). To implement these goals, the Working Group recommended increasing public participation in decisionmaking. Their "Multiple Resource Advisory Councils"
became the centerpiece for the Babbitt's Rangeland Reform '94 proposal. Id.
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discuss the Colorado model, and implement the model at the national
level. 110
On March 18, 1994, after several months of hearings, Babbitt unveiled
the product of his meetings. 131 As promised the proposal would move grazing
decisions away from Washington and back to the local level. It would do
away with grazing advisory boards, which were dominated by ranchers, and
would replace them with "multiple resource advisory councils" for each
BLM district. The councils would be composed of fifteen members: five
environmentalists, five state or local officials or users of public lands, and
five representatives of local commodity interests, such as grazing, mining, or
timber. As Babbitt said introducing the proposal,"Our focus is on shifting
more management decisions closer to the land. Those closest to the
land-those who live on the land-are in the best position to care for it."' 32
The councils would be instructed to work together and would play a key role
in the development of local grazing standards-such as how many cattle
would be allowed on a grazing allotment. They also would have the authority
to appeal directly to the Secretary of the Interior if the BLM managers do not
accept their recommendations.' 33
Babbitt's proposal was criticized by both ranching and environmental
interests: Ranchers contend that the plan still does not have enough flexibility
at the local level, which could squeeze more ranchers off the land; environmentalists counter that the proposal gives too much control to ranchers." 4
Moreover, environmentalists argued that what worked well in a small Colorado community may not work well across the West.' 35 Although this proposal

130. Hinchman, supra note 127, at 11. Babbitt may be willing to modify the Range
Reform '94 proposal. He is considering a "Wyoming model" sponsored by Governor
Sullivan. See Kerry Drake, Panel Unveils Wyo Range Plan, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, Aug.
3, 1994, at Al; Michael Riley, Ranchers Tell Wallop Range Reform Woes, CASPER STARTRIBUNE, July 16, 1994, at Al. Babbitt is also working with Utah's political leaders on
alterations. Babbitt flexible on range reform. THE DENVER PosT, July 12, 1994, at lB.
131. 58 Fed. Reg. 14314 (1994). For a description of Babbitt's proposal, see John H.
Cushman, Jr., Administration Offers Plan To Raise Feesfor Ranchers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
1994, at B6; Melissa Healy, Babbitt Dies Again to Reform Grazing Rules, Raise Fees, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1994, at A23; Tom Kenworyhy, Babbitt Announces Plan to Create Local

"Councils" to Manage FederalRangelands, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1994, at A5.
132. Elliot Diringer, supra note 126, at A3.
133. 58 Fed. Reg. 14318 (1994).
134. Id. John H. Cushman Jr., New Interior range reform plan outlined, CASPER
STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 18, 1994, at Al; Michael Riley. Environmentalists:Local politics,
not standards, guide range reform, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE, May 18, 1994 at Al; Riley,
supra note 96, at Al.
135. Tom Kenworthy, Babbitt Announces Plan to CreateLocal "Councils" to Manage Federal Rangelands, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1994, at A5. The Colorado Rangeland
Reform Working Group also "recognize[d] that this Colorado model may not be applicable
to other Western states." 58 Fed. Reg. 14317 (1994).
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36

its future is in doubt

now has the support of most Western Democrats,

because of the Republican landslide in the 1994 elections. Even if the plan is
enacted, both ranchers and environmentalists may bring lawsuits.'37
Although scholars would not characterize Babbitt's most recent efforts
as an ideal dispute resolution process, Western Democrats have given their
support because it met more of the requirements for a successful dispute
resolution process. 3 First, these new meetings broadened public involve' to create "a collaborative process."" The process also created better
ment"39
opportunities for the exploration of shared interests. Environmentalists and
ranchers realized, for example, that perhaps the biggest threat to the West in
41
the 21st century is the explosion of condominiums and secondary homes.'
But instead of using the exploration of interests to develop a number of
options and possible solutions, Babbitt's process took a twist. His proposal
would give responsibility to the local councils. Consequently, Babbitt's
proposal would balance the number of environmentalists and ranchers because he "wants genuine consensus from the new panels, not recommendations adopted when one side outvotes the other." 42
136. Representative George Miller, then chairman of the House Interior Committee,
stated that "nobody is 100% satisfied" but predicted the proposal would be implemented.
Melissa Healy, supra note 131, at A23. Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, paladin of grazing
reformers in the Senate, said "it was not a thumbs up or a thumbs down," but "kind of a
thumbs sideways." Cushman, supra note 131, at B6. Both agreed that Babbitt had worked
very hard to develop this proposal and the they "don't want to rain on his parade." Id.
137. See Steve Hinehman & Donica Mensing, The West's grazing war grinds on,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 27, 1994, at 5.
138. The author believes that Western Republicans will not support Babbitt's newest
proposal for political reasons.
139. A reporter at the meetings described Babbitt's approach:
Again and again, Babbitt stressed that full public participation was the way to build
consensus and come to a shared vision of the land on a local level. The model, he
said, would be the working groups ranchers and environmentalists have formed to
manage various grazing allotments around the West.
Christensen, supra note 108, at 8; see also John H. Cushman Jr., A Consensus Approach
on Land Use, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 19, 1994, at 8.
140. Jeff Barker, Babbitt plan would double grazing fees; new proposal fails to
please either side, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 1994, at A19.
141. "Increasingly, the cowboy, that tarnished icon of American mythology, is being
viewed as a potential ally against the relentless encroachment of subdivisions, shopping
centers, golf courses and mass tourism." Frank Clifford, Ecologists and Ranchers Try to
Mend Fences, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6 1993, at Al. "Ultimately what both sides want is the
same thing . . . Healthy, productive ranges and healthy, productive communities." Jim
Carrier, Land Rivals Reach Common (Grazing)Ground, THE DENVER POST, Apr. 3, 1994
at 1C (quoting T. Wright Dickinson, rancher and participant in Colorado negotiations over
ranching). Other well-known environmental advocates have also argued that trying to kick
ranchers off of federal land is a poor strategy for environmentalists. WILKINSON, supra
note 77, at 150-53; See Marston, supra note 106, at 15.
142. Cushman, supra note 134. See also Babbitt, supra note 108, at 404. To
insure a general consensus exists, at least three out of five members of each subgroup
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Unfortunately, forcing the development of options and solutions down
to the local level will probably fail to produce consensus for the simple reason that it is not voluntary. Consensus cannot be produced by federal fiat. 43
Bryce Reece, executive director of the Wyoming Wool Growers Association
cautions: "There is a lot of value to people sitting down and talking [but]
I'm just not sure it should be mandatory."'" In addition, Babbitt may have
mistakenly believed that individual examples of cooperation would be accepted by disputing interests groups that are more comfortable with conflict. 45
The Gunnison group took a decade to build trust and were aided by a common enemy-real estate developers. Consequently, in spite of Babbitt's
hopes, the only thing environmentalists and ranchers agree on is that they do
not like the councils. As one environmentalist opined, "[tihey are basically a
new forum through which the ritual combat will continue." 'I
IV. THE LIMITs OF CONSENSUS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING
The preceding section described Bruce Babbitt's efforts to resolve
environmental disputes through consensus. It used dispute resolution
theory to explain the reasons for his successes and failures. This descriptive analysis is politically important to government leaders like Secretary
Babbitt because it can help him improve his dispute resolution efforts,
producing more agreement and support for his policies, and ultimately
more votes for President Clinton. The individuals whose lives will be
affected by the Clinton Administration's policies also stand to benefit
from processes that give all sides more control over the outcome. This
descriptive analysis, however, raises normative questions about use of
dispute resolution processes to develop environmental policy-that is,
when should the goal of consensus drive environmental policy? 47 This

(i.e. industry, environmentalists, and public officials) must support a decision. Riley,
supra note 21, at A10.
143. Id. at AI0.
144. Id.
145. Id. at Al, A10.
146. Cushman, supra note 134, at Al. Joe Feller, an Arizona attorney who recently
won a court case against the BLM also doubts whether consensus can be achieved. See
Feller, supra note 86, at 577. Steve Hinchman & Donica Mensing, The West's grazing
war grinds on, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 27, 1994, at 5. The biggest obstacle to the
success of the counsels may be environmentalists who do not want any grazing at all. "I
really don't want people on these regional advisory councils who are dedicated to the
notion that we want the ranges cattle free," Mr. Babbitt said. "They are outside the parameters." Cushman, supra note 134, at Al.
147. In other words, analyzing Bruce Babbitt's consensus building style begs the
question of whether joint gains in fact exist. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
As dispute resolution has grown more popular, it has become a "common error" to focus
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section concludes that the goal of environmental consensus is appropriate
in only limited situations.
Dispute resolution experts have a decided disagreement about the appropriate role of dispute resolution in environmental conflict. 1'4 For example,
Lawrence Susskind believes that government sponsored mediation can be
used to establish and implement governmental policy.' 49 John McCrory, on
the other hand, cautions against confusing mediation with policymaking:
The Susskind proposal is flawed by a failure to consider, in a practical way, the role that mediation can and should play in the resolution
of environmental disputes. It is not designed to establish policy or to
establish standards which implement policy. Mediation is part of a
negotiation process, and its function is to help parties to a dispute
reach their own agreement. As such, mediation has great potential as
a device for developing a consensus which might aid in establishing
or implementing policy. The distinction between using mediation to
establish policy and using it to aid such an effort is one of significance. A mediator is a facilitator, not a decisionmaker nor a
policymaker. It is important to recognize mediation for what it is and
to formulate the role which it will play in resolving environmental
disputes accordingly. Alteration of the process in the ways suggested
by Professor Susskind is likely to curtail rather than to enhance its
acceptability and use. 50
Bacow and Wheeler contend that many environmental conflicts arise
because "people assess probabilities, outcomes, and risks differently."'
Others argue that environmental conflicts are only a problem of misunderstanding, to which dispute resolution can always provide a remedy.' 52
Gerald Cormick believes that consensus-building is appropriate only when
there is a relative balance of power between the parties, which occurs in
about ten percent of environmental conflicts.' 53

on style to "the exclusion of the underlying substantive quest to create value." LAX &
SEBENIUS, supra note 15, at 113-14.
148. See AMY, supra note 11, at170-85 (discussing the different approaches to environmental conflict).
149. Susskind, supra note 13, at 11-13.

150. John P. McCrory, Environmental Mediation-Another Piecefor the Puzzle, 6
VT. L. REV. 49, 63-64 (1981).
151. BACOW & WHEELER, supra note 12, at 9.

152. AMY, supra note 11, at 170-71 (criticizing mediation techniques that assume
most environmental disputes are caused by misunderstandings rather than direct and unavoidable conflicts of interest between environmentalists and developers).
153. Id. at 80-82.
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Clearing up the confusion over the appropriate role of consensus in
environmental conflict requires a reexamination of the fundamental principle
of dispute resolution. Dispute resolution is a process by which two or more
conflicting parties make themselves better off through cooperative action."
In other words, cooperative action allows both parties to expand the pie, or
prevent the pie from shrinking, giving each party a larger slice when they
eventually divide the pie.155 Thus, to determine if dispute resolution techniques are appropriate for a particular environmental conflict, the 6critical
threshold question is whether there is a mutual opportunity for gain.1
A simple example helps to illustrate the importance of this concept.
Many people today are using alternative dispute resolution, or ADR,
rather than litigation to resolve their disputes. ADR techniques are generally considered faster, cheaper, and better able to leave the parties satisfied with the process. 3 7 Thus, if litigation and an ADR technique are
likely to produce virtually identical substantive outcomes, both parties
benefit from the speed and lower costs of the ADR technique. If, however, one party expects that an ADR technique will produce substantive
outcomes that are systematically worse than litigation, 58 then that party

154. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 15, at 11 (1986); see also supra notes 14-16. Dispute resolution does not simply mean the cessation of conflict. Under that definition, dispute resolution could include war and litigation. Both war and litigation, however, usually
leave both parties worse off. Another way to conceptualize the process is to analyze whether the conflict is a "zero-sum game" or a "plus-sum game." In "zero-sum games" gain for
one party causes loss for another. On the other hand, "plus-sum games" create the possibility of "win-win" solutions through collaborative effort. Harter, supra note 37, at 48.
155. For example, cooperative action may include both parties agreeing to arbitration
to avoid litigation expenses.
156. " mhe parties themselves must believe that it is in their interests to negotiate the
policy with the other parties, and that other means of exercising power are frustrated by
countervailing power of one or more interested parties." Harter, supra note 37, at 45-46.
In the parlance of Fisher and Ury, authors of Getting to Yes, each party must be able to
achieve a better outcome through negotiation or a dispute resolution process than their
"Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement," or BATNA. FISHER & URY, supra note 23,
at 104. If a party's BATNA is better than any collaborative outcome, they will have no incentive to explore options and possible solutions; instead, they will simply pursue unilateral action. In addition, the parties must be receptive to the creation of a dispute resolution
process, and not view it as a dilatory tactic. See Peterson, supra note 42, at 370.
157. See e.g., BACOW & WHEELER, supranote 12, at 12-23. Douglas Amy disagrees
with these assertions in the case of mediation, but has little empirical support for his arguments. AMY, supra note 11, at 71-79.
158. Many environmentalists believe that Babbitt's efforts to develop consensus about
grazing reform will systematically disadvantage environmentalists. For example, environmentalists may not have the training or support to counter well-funded ranchers with professional lobbyists. Dan Heinz, Consensus May Not Be the Best Way to Reform Grazing,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 15 (also stating that "[t]here is a fundamental
ethical flaw in consensus decision-making" because ranchers have a monetary stake in
public land management); see generally AMY, supra note 11, at 87-153; Owen Fiss,
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will naturally oppose the ADR technique. In addition, if ADR produces
unfair results, then society should not impose this process on the disputants and should allow them to use our legal system.
By establishing that dispute resolution processes should be used only
when mutual opportunity for gain exists, it follows that we need a better
understanding of those situations in which opportunities for mutual gain
are likely. This determination can be difficult, however, because the
opportunity for mutual gain is not always apparent ex ante. Parties may
not discover "win-win" solutions until they begin collaboratively brainstorming. Nevertheless, there are several cues that signal the presence of
opportunities for mutual gain.
Sometimes the number of issues that are at stake will provide an
indication. If only one issue is at stake, there is no opportunity for gains
from trade,' 59 and consequently, the dispute is very likely a "zero-sum

game." 1"° If on the other hand, the dispute concerns several issues, the
parties may be able to benefit from gains from trade.
A better indicator than the number of issues is the presence of fundamental values. Generally defined, a party's fundamental value is a
deeply held belief that cannot be compromised or traded without somehow
changing the nature of a person.' 61 Consequently, consensus-building
processes cannot solve disputes over fundamental values. As Phillip
Harter aptly suggests, "[s]urely, no agreement could be reached over
which of several religions is superior."' 62 To cite an environmental example, environmentalists simply will not compromise when a developer tries
to build a dude ranch in a wilderness area. 163
Although the presence of fundamental values provides a clear indication of when dispute resolution techniques are appropriate, fundamental
values can be difficult to identify. Large organizations or political moveAgainst Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). For a contrary view, see Leigh L. Thompson, Elizabeth A. Mannix, & Max H. Bazerman, Group Negotiation: Effects of Decision
Rule, Agenda, and Aspiration, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 86, 92 (1988) (finding that groups who seek a consensus are more likely to achieve higher joint outcomes, to
integrate the interests of group members, and to distribute resources more equitably than
groups using a majority decision rule).
159. For a discussion of how parties can develop "win-win" solutions through gains
from trade, see LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 15, at 89-114.
160. Harter, supra note 37, at 50.
161.

WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY REVISITED 199-

202 (1992).
162. Hatter, supra note 37, at 49.
163. See Steve Hinchman, Developer Builds in a Wilderness, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Sept. 7, 1992, at 1 (reporting environmentalists unwilling to compromise or negotiate
about inholding in Colorado wilderness).
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ments may have internal disagreements about when compromise or concessions are acceptable. For example, some "grass roots" environmentalists such as Alexander Cockburn have decried "Establishment" environmental groups who support President Clinton's Pacific Northwest timber
proposal. Cockburn believes these "Establishment" groups are too willing
to compromise:
On the other side of the fence are the defenders of the forests,
who have their own schedule: Save the last of the ancient forest
of the Pacific Northwest and ban log exports .

.

. The defenders

also seek protection for ravaged forests east of the Cascades. But
outside this set of core demands there is predictable diversity,
from the environmental Establishment through the spectrum to the
Western Ancient Forest Campaign, Save America's Forests or the
Oregon Natural Resources Council. Here we enter the shadow of
the trade-off, where the Establishment groups cut the deals."
Because Cockburn believes any further cutting in the old growth Northwest forests is wrong, he eschews the goal of consensus, arguing that
consensus is just a code word for compromise. l "Consensus," asserts
Cockburn, is a "verbal soft toy-" of President Clinton and "one of the
most insidious catchwords of the Clinton era."1
While it is not possible to resolve environmentalists' disagreement
over the definition of fundamental values, it also is not necessary. What is
necessary is that any government sponsored dispute resolution process
must be voluntary. So long as parties are free to withdraw from the process, concerns about fundamental values are immaterial. The Alaska
fishermen's controversy demonstrates this point. Exxon chose not to come
to the bargaining table. Had Babbitt tried to force a compromise between

164. Alexander Cockburn, Compromise Kills Nature by Inches, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1,
1993, at B7 [hereinafter Compromise Kills]. For another criticism, see Jeffrey St. Clair,
Babbitt is no Stegner or Abbey, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 6, 1993, at 16. For a response from an "Establishment" group, see Karin Sheldon, Wilderness Society (editorial
letter), L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, at B7. In a later article, Cockburn charges that the
"Establishment" groups have compromised their fundamental values because "the mainstream environmental leadership in Washington has grown fat with corporate contributions
and subventions from foundations such as the Rockefeller or the Pew Charitable Trusts and
shun confrontation." Alexander Cockbum, UlteriorSecretary: Babbitt Makes Me Miss Jim
Watt, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1993, at Cl [hereinafter Ulterior Secretary].
165. See id. See also AMY, supra note 11, at 170-71; Seth Cagin and Philip Dray,
Are the Greens Turning Yellow?, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at A23.
166. Alexander Cockburn, Clintonspeak Meets the Chain Saw, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1993, at B7. Cockburn goes on to characterize "alternative dispute resolution" as "coercive harmony," an ideological movement which he believes has swept the country.
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the parties, a conflict over fundamental values may have developed. 67 On
the other hand, Babbitt's attempt to develop a consensus about the "New
West " ' clashed sharply with fundamental interests of ranchers-maintaining their livelihood as well as culture.
There may be a reason why some scholars have been over-anxious to recommend government-sponsored dispute resolution. When
private parties hire a dispute resolution expert to facilitate a solution,
it is easy to preserve a voluntary process. But when scholars suggest
that the successes of private dispute resolution can be achieved with
governmental dispute resolution they overlook an insidious danger:
governments can force parties to participate in a dispute resolution
process, eliminating voluntariness. 69 Moreover, governments can use
the process not to create opportunity for mutual gain but to squelch
opposition to government policies. 70 This occurred during the 1989
President Clinton and
Pacific Northwest "timber compromise."'
Secretary Babbitt, trying to resolve the same timber controversy, also
have succumbed to this temptation to coerce a "consensus." They
threatened to propose legislation that would make timber sales immune
from legal challenge if the environmentalists did not support Clinton's
plan."7 Thus, politicians should be charged with the responsibility to
not corrupt dispute resolution processes or consensus-building efforts
by eliminating voluntariness. It is also incumbent upon dispute resolution experts to recognize the natural tendencies of politicians, and to
counsel against government perversion of dispute resolution processes.
While we should be wary of government sponsored dispute resolution processes, the view of some environmentalists that consensus is
always bad should also be questioned. For example, environmentalists
like Cockburn believe that consensus means compromise, and compromise is always bad for the environment:
The rhythms of the trade-off are antipathetic to [the protection of
old-growth trees, ecosystems and bio-regions]. Trade-offs means a
preserve here against the lifting of an injunction there, saving the

167. Although we normally do not think of corporations as having fundamental
values, if they have any, one would certainly be not wasting money-giving money to
those who the corporation believes are undeserving claimants.
168. See supra text accompanying note 118.
169. AMY, supra note 11, at 149-50.
170. Id. at 151-52.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
172. Tom Kenworthy, Interior, Allies at Loggerheads Over l7mber, WASH. POST,
Sept. 23, 1993, at A9.
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west side of the Cascades at the expense of everything east, a bit of
"sufficiency," [i.e. legislation making logging plans immune to legal
challenge] some regulated pillage and, at the end of the day, the
fragmentation of ecosystems in a fashion familiar to the beleaguered
gnat catcher, facing doom in its "win-win" scenario. 73
The contention that shared interests and consensus can never exist is
flawed. The ranchers and environmentalists who developed genuine consensus in Gunnison, Colorado, 74 and other experiences' 75 prove otherwise. In addition, while compromise may not be popular with environmentalists or ranchers, some times it is a better option than conflict.
V. CONCLUSION
Government policymaking by a consensus process is a noble aspiration. It gives individuals the opportunity to design the laws that govern
their lives. As this article has discussed, however, there can be many
barriers to the cooperative resolution of conflict. If a government sponsored dispute resolution process is poorly designed, disputing parties can
overlook mutually beneficial solutions and may never reach a consensus.
The first half of this article suggests that Secretary Babbitt could
benefit from dispute resolution theories. Bruce Babbitt became the
Secretary of Interior because he believed he could develop a consensus
around the philosophy of a "New West." His initial efforts at grazing
reform, however, created more opposition than consensus. His initial
efforts failed because his process was not voluntary and it did not
allow for a genuinely collaborative search for creative solutions. It
remains to be seen whether Babbitt's latest grazing reform proposal,
which establishes councils comprised of both ranchers and environmentalists, will produce consensus at the local level.
Having suggested ways to improve government sponsored dispute
resolution processes, the second half of this essay warns that
policymaking by consensus may not always be appropriate. Some conflicts-those that do not provide an opportunity for mutual
gain-simply are not amenable to a consensus solution no matter what

173. Cockburn, Compromise Kills, supra note 164; see also AMY, supra note 11, at
173; Cockburn, UlteriorSecretary, supra note 164.
174. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
175. See e.g., Melling, supra note 10, at 1693-1703, for a discussion of how politicians, environmentalists and water users worked together to find a collaborative solution
to a dispute over water in Utah.
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process is proposed. 76 Occasionally, such as during the Timber Summit of 1989, government leaders succumb to the temptation of forcing
dispute resolution processes on unwilling parties, either to use the
process as a political sham or to arm-twist the parties into consent. In
neither case will true consensus be obtained. Instead, voluntary participation should guide governments' attempts to foster dispute resolution. In short, "[i]f there is no consensus about using consensus, the
whole process simply will not work."177

176. In addition to trying to resolve the controversies surrounding grazing, the California gnatchatcher, the Florida Everglades, and the Northwest ancient forests, Babbitt is
hoping to avoid these "train wrecks" in the future by conducting a National Biological
Survey. The survey is designed to promote an ecosystem approach to land management,
and make plans to protect species before they become endangered. William K. Stevens,
Battle Loorts Over U.S. Policy on Species, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at Cl. If the
federal government hopes to resolve more natural resource disputes by consensus, Babbitt's preventative medicine approach is the key.
177. Jones, supra note 11, at 168.
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